Table of Contents:
1. Introduction
I. International Investment Law: From Good Governance for Foreign Investors to Good Governance for All
II. Conceptual Framework
III. Outline of Chapters
2. Genesis of ‘Good Governance’ Narratives in International Investment Law and Scholarship: An Historical and Doctrinal Analysis
I. Conceptual Inspirations behind the Good Governance Narratives of Investment Treaty Law
II. Embodiments of Good Governance Precepts in Investment Treaty Law
III. Competing Visions of Investment Treaty Law and its Good Governance Promise
IV. Conclusion
3. How Do Host States Respond to Investment Treaty Law?
I. The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Governance in Host States: Key Empirical Questions
II. Methodology
III. Are Government Officials Aware of International Investment Law and its Good Governance Prescriptions?
IV. How Host States ‘Learn’ from Investment Arbitration
V. Negative Internalisation: Over-protection and Withdrawal
VI. Internalising Investment Treaty Prescriptions: Why, at Whose Behest and What Cost?
VII. Conclusion
4. The Role of Remedy Design in Inducing Host States to Comply with Investment Treaty Standards of Good Governance
I. Damages as a Principal Form of Relief for an Investment Treaty Breach
II. Can State Compliance with Good Governance Standards be Fostered through Monetary Sanctions?
III. The Design of Investment Treaty Remedies and State Compliance with Good Governance Standards:
A Functional Analysis
IV. Compliance and Optimal Remedy Design: Punitive, Non-pecuniary, Multi-tiered?
V. Conclusion
5. Investment Treaty Law and its Internal Capacity to Foster Good Governance in Host States
I. Is the Investment Treaty Regime Compliant with Good Governance Standards?
II. Legitimacy and ‘Compliance Pull’: (Insufficient) Transparency and Coherence of Investment Treaty Rules
and Arbitral Jurisprudence
III. Internationalisation of Investment Law and its (Disempowering) Effects on Governance in Host States
IV. Good Governance as a Two-way Street: Dealing with Investor Misconduct in Treaty Practice and Arbitration
V. Conclusion
6. International Investment Law and its Anti-participatory Animus
I. The Investment Treaty Regime and Its Disregard for the Political and Social Interfaces of Development
II. Foreign Investors and the Domestic Political Process
III. Developing Countries and the Making of International Investment Law: Lack of Participation and Inclusivity
IV. Lack of Stakeholder Input in the Making of Investment Treaties in Developed Countries
V. Conclusion
7. Conclusion
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