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  • Sách tham khảo
  • Ký hiệu PL/XG: 341.55 CAR 2015
    Nhan đề: International courts and the performance of international agreements :
Giá tiền 2738000
DDC 341.55
Tác giả CN Carrubba, Clifford J.
Nhan đề International courts and the performance of international agreements :a general theory with evidence from the European Union /Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel
Thông tin xuất bản New York, N.Y. :Cambridge University Press,2015
Mô tả vật lý viii, 243 p. :ill. ;24 cm.
Tóm tắt Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.
Thuật ngữ chủ đề International relations
Thuật ngữ chủ đề International Courts
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Internationella domstolar-sao-170307
Thuật ngữ chủ đề Internationella relationer-sao-149105
Tên vùng địa lý European Union countries-Foreign relations
Từ khóa Luật Quốc tế
Từ khóa Điều ước quốc tế
Từ khóa Tòa án quốc tế
Từ khóa Liên minh châu Âu
Tác giả(bs) CN Gabel, Matthew J.
Địa chỉ DHLĐọc giáo viênA(1): GVA 002433
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040 |aYDXCP|cVN-DHLHNI-TT|dVN-DHLHNI-TT
0410|aeng
044|aUS
082|a341.55|bCAR 2015
1001 |aCarrubba, Clifford J.
24510|aInternational courts and the performance of international agreements :|ba general theory with evidence from the European Union /|cClifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel
260 |aNew York, N.Y. :|bCambridge University Press,|c2015
300 |aviii, 243 p. :|bill. ;|c24 cm.
504 |aIncludes bibliographical references and index
5208 |aNations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.
650 0|aInternational relations
650 0|aInternational Courts
650 7|aInternationella domstolar|2sao|0170307
650 7|aInternationella relationer|2sao|0149105
651 0|aEuropean Union countries|xForeign relations
653|aLuật Quốc tế
653|aĐiều ước quốc tế
653|aTòa án quốc tế
653|aLiên minh châu Âu
698 |aQuan hệ quốc tế
7001 |aGabel, Matthew J.
852|aDHL|bĐọc giáo viên|cA|j(1): GVA 002433
890|a1|b1|c0|d0
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1 GVA 002433 Đọc giáo viên 341.55 CAR 2015 Sách tham khảo 1

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