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International courts and the performance of international agreements : a general theory with evidence from the European Union / Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel
New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, 2015
viii, 243 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.
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Kooperation internationaler Gerichte :. Bd. 36 / : Lösung zwischengerichtlicher Konflikte durch herrschaftsfreien Diskurs . / Michael Nunne.
Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, 2009
XXXII, 483 S. ; 24 cm.
Since the end of the 20th century, the number of international courts and tribunals has more than tripled, which means that an increasing number of international disputes are being settled peacefully in judicial proceedings. This development has aroused fears that the marginal external coordination of the courts could lead to a fragmentation of international law and could weaken the peaceful settlement of disputes. Based on a study of just under 300 decisions made in seven major jurisdictions, Michael Nunner disproves this theory. International courts preserve the unity and the integrity of international law by establishing a non-hierarchical discourse and by recognizing and referring to the decisions of other courts. Using a game theory analysis, it is possible to identify the long-term interests of the courts and reciprocal cooperation as fundamental causes of this reception and to document the evolution of the cooperation between courts
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